Ardestani v. United States Department of Justice: Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Deportation Proceedings - Exalting Technicalities over Justice by Mehta, Khurshid K.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 16 | Number 2 Article 10
Fall 1991
Ardestani v. United States Department of Justice:
Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to
Deportation Proceedings - Exalting Technicalities
over Justice
Khurshid K. Mehta
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Khurshid K. Mehta, Ardestani v. United States Department of Justice: Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Deportation Proceedings -
Exalting Technicalities over Justice, 16 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 435 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol16/iss2/10
Ardestani v. United States Department of Justice: Applying the Equal
Access to Justice Act to Deportation Proceedings - Exalting Technicalities
over Justice
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol16/iss2/10
CASENOTES
Ardestani v. United States Department of Justice:




In 1980, Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) to aid small businesses and individuals faced with the legal
cost of challenging unjustified government actions. It provides, inter
alia, that attorney's fees shall be awarded to a small business or indi-
vidual who sues and prevails against the United States.' The EAJA
applies to agency proceedings that fall within the scope of an adver-
sary adjudication. 2 In Ardestani v. U.S. Department ofJustice, I.N.S. 3, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered
the question of applicability of the EAJA to deportation proceed-
ings.4 The Eleventh Circuit held that the EAJA is not applicable to
deportation proceedings because such proceedings do not fall within
the definition of an adversary adjudication. 5
This Note examines the reasoning of Ardestani and its implica-
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . .
incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),
including proceedings for judicial review of agency action . . . unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust.
Id. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988) states in part:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevail-
ing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by
that party in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer
of the agency finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified
or that special circumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the po-
sition of the agency was substantially justified shall be determined on the
basis of the administrative record, as a whole, which is made in the adversary
adjudication for which fees and other expenses are sought.
Id.
2 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(3) (1988). The language of the EAJA states that it applies to
adversary adjudication under section 504 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id.
3 904 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1990).
4 Id. at 1508.
5 Id. at 1515.
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tions for deportation and other agency proceedings. It sketches the
history of the EAJA from its inception in 1980 and highlights the
ambiguities in the Act that have caused conflicting interpretations
among the appellate courts. The Note concludes that the majority
opinion is flawed from an indulgence in technicalities, a misreading
of critical provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and a misplaced reli-
ance on certain case law. As a practical matter, the Ardestani decision
will decrease an indigent alien's accessibility to counsel in deporta-
tion proceedings.
II. Overview of the Ardestani Facts and Decision
In 1982, Ardestani, an Iranian woman, entered the United
States as a visitor.6 Fearing persecution upon her return to Iran,
Ardestani applied for asylum in the United States. Acting in its advi-
sory capacity, the United States Department of State notified the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) that Ardestani's fear of
persecution was well-founded. 7 Despite the State Department's find-
ing, the INS denied Ardestani's asylum application and ordered her
to show cause why she should not be deported.8 At the deportation
hearing, the immigration judge (IJ) found that Ardestani had estab-
lished a well-founded fear of persecution and granted her asylum for
one year.9
Ardestani applied for attorney's fees and expenses incurred by
her in this action. The IJ awarded attorney's fees pursuant to the
EAJA since Ardestani was the prevailing party and INS's opposition
to her asylum application was not substantially justified.' 0 On ap-
peal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the award of
attorney fees and expenses made by the IJ on the ground that these
adversary proceedings fell under the INA and not under the EAJA. " I
Thereafter, Ardestani filed a petition before the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals to review the BIA decision. The court ruled that
BIA had correctly found that the IJ had no statutory authority to
award attorney's fees to Ardestani since the proceeding was not
6 Id. at 1507.
7 The State Department makes the determination whether the fear of persecution is
well-founded and submits, its recommendation to the INS. Being the repository of infor-
mation on foreign governments, the State Department's recommendation is given due def-
erence and generally adopted by the INS.
8 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1507.
9 Id.
1O Id.
II Id. at 1508. The Board took into account the regulations promulgated by the
United States Attorney General to implement the EAJA. See 28 C.F.R. § 24 (1982). Since
deportation proceedings are not specifically covered by these regulations, they were
deemed to be outside the sphere of these regulations. See id. § 24.103.
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under the EAJA and affirmed the decision of the BIA. t 2
An adversary adjudication is "an adjudication under section 554
[of the Administrative Procedure Act] in which the position of the
United States is represented by counsel."' 3 The court in Ardestani
maintained that a deportation proceeding is an adversary adjudica-
tion under the INA but not under the APA. 14 Since the EAJA waives
sovereign immunity in allowing attorney's fees against the United
States,' 5 the Ardestani court felt constrained to construe the Act in a
strict fashion. Construing the statute strictly, the court held that
deportation proceedings do not fall within the ambit of the EAJA.
The court's conclusion was further buttressed by commentary from
the model rules 16 for agency implementation of the EAJA issued by
the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). Expres-
sing concern that a "liberal interpretation of the draft rules may pro-
vide for broader applicability than Congress intended"'17, the ACUS
restricted "awards to cases required to be conducted under the pro-
cedures of section 554."18
The Ardestani court's decision not to treat a deportation pro-
ceeding as an adversary adjudication under the APA was also based
on the United States Supreme Court decision in Marcello v. Bonds. 19
In Marcello, the Supreme Court held that "the hearing requirements
of the APA do not govern deportation proceedings, which are con-
trolled under section 242 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. section 1252."2o The
Marcello Court attributed the similarities of the hearing provisions
under the APA and under the INA to the fact that the APA was used
as a model for the INA. 2 1 Despite these similarities, the Marcello
Court maintained that section 242 of the INA was a deliberate at-
tempt by Congress to create a separate procedure tailored to depor-
tation proceedings and therefore APA hearing provisions should not
apply to deportation proceedings.2 2 Relying on this determination,
the court in Ardestani reasoned that since deportation proceedings
are not governed by the provisions of the APA, such proceedings are
not within the scope of the EAJA. 23
12 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1515.
13 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
14 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1511-12.
15 Id. at 1509.
16 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900 (1981). Model rules are intended to provide guidance to
agencies in developing their own regulations and to promote uniformity of procedures.
Id.
17 Id. at 32,901.
18 Id.
19 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
20 Ardestani v. United States Dep't of Justice, 904 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir.
1990)(citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955)).
21 Marcello, 349 U.S. at 308-09.
22 Id.
23 This reasoning of the Ardestani court seems to be flawed. The inapplicability of the
1991]
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Additional support for its holding that deportation proceedings
are not covered by the EAJA was found by the Ardestani court in the
regulations 24 implementing the EAJA. The regulations list the pro-
ceedings covered by the EAJA. Deportation proceedings are not
found in the most recent promulgation of the list.25 The information
published with the interim rule reveals that deportation hearings
were intentionally excluded pursuant to Marcello.26 Congress was
aware of this regulatory exclusion when it amended the EAJA in
1985. The Ardestani court argued that Congress's decision to allow
this regulatory exclusion to stand, at a time when it had the opportu-
nity to abolish the exclusion, confirms its intention to exclude depor-
tation proceedings from the EAJA. 2 7 Additionally, the absence of
criticism by the ACUS of the Attorney General's interpretation re-
garding the inapplicability of the EAJA to deportation proceedings
lent further support to the Ardestani court's determination that the
regulation was a reasonable construction of the EAJA.28
The decision of the Ardestani court also turned on its interpreta-
tion of section 292 of the INA as an existing fee-shifting statute. Sec-
tion 292 of the INA states that "[i]n any exclusion or deportation
proceeding,. . . the person concerned shall have the privilege of be-
ing represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, au-
thorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose." 29 The
fee-shifting provision of the EAJA is mandatory in that it must be
followed "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute."30
Nevertheless, the EAJA fee-shifting provision "is not intended to re-
place or supersede any existing fee-shifting statute [and] . . . is in-
tended to apply only to cases . . . where fee awards against the
government are not already authorized."' s The Ardestani court read
section 292 of the INA as an existing fee-shifting provision and
thereby concluded that it could not be superseded by the fee-shifting
provision of the EAJA. 3 2 Additionally, the court found that the
"general language of EAJA [was] insufficient to overcome the abso-
lute words of the [INA]." s33 In the absence of any clear intention
otherwise, "a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by the
APA hearing provisions to deportation proceedings does not necessarily take these pro-
ceedings outside the scope of the EAJA.
24 See 28 C.F.R. § 24 (1982).
25 Id. § 24.103 (1989).
26 See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,921, 48,922 (1981).
27 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1512.
28 Id.
29 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988) (emphasis added).
30 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(I)(A) (1988).
31 H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEws 4997.
32 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1513.
33 Id. at 1514.
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general one."'3 4 Not finding any clear congressional intent in the
EAJA to amend the INA fee-shifting provision, the Ardestani court
concluded that the EAJA fee-shifting provision does not apply to de-
portation proceedings.
The dissent in Ardestani found deportation proceedings to fall
squarely within the definition of an "adversary proceeding" under
section 554 since these proceedings were adjudications "required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing."3 5 Furthermore, the dissent found fault with the
majority's application of the rule in Marcello to remove deportation
proceedings from the ambit of the EAJA. The dissent reasoned that
even if the INA hearing provisions supersede the hearing provisions
of the APA, such supersession does not erase the fact that deporta-
tion proceedings are of the type defined under section 554.36 Fi-
nally, the dissent did not find "the recovery of attorney's fees
pursuant to EAJA [to be] in conflict with nor precluded by section
292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act"37 because section 292 is
designed to prevent the appointment of counsel for indigent aliens
in deportation proceedings and is not a fee-shifting statute.3 8
III. Background on Applicability of EAJA to Deportation
Proceedings
In 1980, Congress enacted the EAJA to enable individuals and
small businesses to recover attorney fees when they prevail in civil
actions against the United States.39 The EAJA has three principal
purposes: first, to enable small parties to defend against unjustified
government actions, second, to deter unjustifiable government ac-
tion and third, to improve the quality of administration of federal law.
through increased exposure to litigation.40 Although the EAJA en-
courages individuals to defend their rights against unreasonable gov-
ernment action, the Act does narrow the scope of the government's
liability by limiting its application to adversary adjudications. 4' The
34 Id. at 1513 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974)).




39 See supra note 1.
40 See Note, Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97 YALE L.J. 1459,
1469 (1988).
41 See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWs 4993 (limiting the government's liability under EAJA by award-
ing fees only in adversary adjudication). The legislative intent can be deciphered from the
following excerpt:
[Tihe decision to award fees only in adversary adjudication reflects a desire
to narrow the scope of the bill in order to make its costs acceptable. It also
reflects a desire to limit the award of fees to situations where participants
have a concrete interest at stake but nevertheless may be deterred from as-
1991] 439
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
EAJA applies to adversary adjudications "under section 554 [of the
APA] in which the position of United States is represented by coun-
sel."'42 Section 554(a) of the APA states that "[tihis section applies
• . . in every case of adjudication required by statute to be deter-
mined on the record after an opportunity for an agency hearing."'43
Deportation proceedings are required by the INA to be determined
on the record after the alien has been given the opportunity for a
hearing4 4 and thus meet the APA's applicability criteria under sec-
tion 554(a). Additionally, the government is represented by counsel
at deportation proceedings. Despite the apparent satisfaction of the
two statutory requirements, courts have not always allowed deporta-
tion proceedings to be treated as adversary adjudications. 45
The interpretation of the phrase "an adjudication under section
554" has been problematic because of its apparent ambiguity.46 The
phrase lends itself to two entirely different interpretations. It may be
interpreted either as "an adjudication defined under section 554 or as
an adjudication governed by section 554. '"47 Since the legislative his-
tory of the EAJA sheds little light on the interpretation to be pre-
ferred, courts have often referred to the commentary accompanying
the model rules48 of the ACUS to interpret the EAJA. Unfortu-
nately, the commentary offers conflicting guidance on the interpreta-
tion of the EAJA. On the one hand, the ACUS commentary
recommends a broad interpretation by stating that "questions of
[EAJA's] coverage should turn on substance.., rather than techni-
calities."'49 On the other hand, it puts a damper on the extent of the
EAJA's coverage by stating that "a liberal interpretation may provide
for broader applicability than Congress intended."50
In contrast to the ambivalance of the commentary accompanying
ACUS's model rules, the legislative history of the EAJA supports a
"defined under" interpretation of the phrase "an adjudication under
section 554."'51 The opinions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
serting or defending that interest because of the time and expense involved
in pursuing administrative remedies.
d.
42 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (1988).
43 Id. § 554(a) (1988).
44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
45 E.g., Ardestani v. United States Dep't of Justice, 904 F.2d 1505, 1516 (11th Cir.
1990) (Pittman, J., dissenting).
46 See Note, Immigration Law--Equal Access to Justice Act-Deportation Proceedings Qualify
Under the Act, Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988), 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 497, 499 n.18 (1989).
47 See id.
48 Model rules were issued by the ACUS for the guidance of federal agencies in im-
plementing the EAJA. These model rules were intended to provide guidance for agencies
in developing their own regulations. See 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900 (1981).
49 Id. at 32,901.
50 Id.
51 See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
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also support a "defined under" interpretation of the phrase.52
These opinions, however, must be read with some circumspection
since they did not involve coverage of deportation proceedings
under the EAJA.
Escobar Ruiz v. INS53 was the first case to consider coverage of
deportation proceedings under the EAJA.54 The Escobar Ruiz court
found that the legislative history and the purpose of the EAJA clearly
supported the "defined under" interpretation. 55 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that deportation proceedings qualify as adversary adjudica-
tions covered by the EAJA because they meet two requirements:
first, the United States is represented by counsel in a deportation
proceeding; and second, deportation proceedings are adjudications
decided on the record after an opportunity for a hearing. 56
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Escobar Ruiz was criticized by
the Sixth Circuit, in Owens v. Brock, 5 7 for its "abandonment of the
principle that waiver of immunity is to be construed narrowly." 58
Although critical of the Escobar Ruiz holding, the Owens decision may
not have significantly diminished the vitality of Escobar Ruiz for three
reasons. First, the Escobar Ruiz case occurred in a deportation con-
text and therefore can be distinguished from Owens which involved a
Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA) proceeding.59 The
complicated nature of INS proceedings coupled with the poor lan-
guage skills of potential deportees makes the argument for access to
the EAJA very compelling in deportation proceedings. 6° Second,
the INS procedures are not excepted from section 554, but FECA
proceedings are specifically excluded from coverage under section
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 5012 (the Committee declared that EAJA "defines adversary ad-
judication as an agency adjudication defined under the Administrative Procedures Act") (em-
phasis added). It must also be noted that Congress changed the words "an adjudication
subject to section 554" to "an adjudication under section 554" thereby intimating its in-
tention that in order for a procedure to be adversary it need not directly be subject to
section 554. Id. at 4989-91.
52 See Smedberg Mach. and Tool, Inc. v. Donovan, 730 F.2d 1089, 1092 (7th Cir.
1984) (EAJA defines adversary adjudication as an "adjudication under section 554 of this
title in which the position of the United States is represented by Counsel or otherwise");
Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir. 1984) (social security proceedings are
adversary proceedings as defined by terms of section 554). See also Bonanza Trucking
Corp. v. U.S., 664 F. Supp. 1453, 1461 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (customs hearings were an
adjudication within the meaning of section 554) (emphasis added).
53 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988).
54 See id. at 1021.
55 Id. at 1023-25.
56 Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 293 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'don rehearing, 838 F.2d
1020 (9th Cir. 1988).
57 860 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1988). In Owens, the court decided that a proceeding for
the determination of employee benefits under the Federal Employees Compensation Act
(FECA) did not constitute an adversary adjudication. Id. at 1367.
58 Id. at 1366.
59 See id. at 1364.
60 See id. at 1366.
1991]
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554.61 Third, the Owens decision could have withstood judicial re-
view solely on the ground that "plaintiff's entitlement to workmen's
compensation was not required by statute to be determined on the
record." 62
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit also rejected the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the phrase "an adjudication under
section 554. '"63 The issue in St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co. v. F.E.R.C.
was whether Department of Energy (DOE) proceedings for con-
testing remedial orders fell within the classification of "adversary ad-
judication" covered by the EAJA.64 The St. Louis Fuel and Supply
court felt bound to honor the canon that "waivers of the sovereign's
immunity must be strictly construed" 65 and therefore ruled that the
DOE proceeding was not covered by the EAJA. Moreover, St. Louis
Fuel and Supply is readily distinguishable from Escobar Ruiz. First, the
St. Louis Fuel and Supply case occurred in a remedial DOE proceeding
and not in a deportation context. Second, whereas the DOE pro-
ceeding in St. Louis Fuel and Supply was not required by the DOE Act
to be on the record, 66 all deportation proceedings are required by
the INA to be on the record. 67
In attempting to fathom the meaning of the phrase "an adjudi-
cation under section 554," the EAJA's treatment of social security
administrative hearings serves as a useful analog. In Richardson v.
Perales,68 the Supreme Court refused to decide whether the APA had
application to social security disability claims because "the social se-
curity administrative procedures [did] not vary from that prescribed
by the APA." 69 After determining that social security proceedings
meet the defined under70 standard, the Richardson Court saw no need
to decide whether the proceedings also met the governed by71 stan-
dard. The Legislature must have been aware of the Richardson deci-
61 See id. at 1365. A provision of FECA specifically excludes workers' compensation
proceedings from coverage under section 554. Id. See also Fidelity Constr. Co. v. United
States, 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983) (proceeding exempted
under section 554 does not constitute an adversary adjudication).
62 Owens, 860 F.2d at 1370 (6th Cir. 1988) (Nelson, J., concurring). In fact, Judge
Nelson reinstated the Escobar holding by stating that at a future date the Owens court was
not foreclosed from reaching the same result as that reached by the Ninth Circuit in Esco-
bar. Id. See also Allen v. Faragasso, 585 F. Supp. 1114 (1984) (FECA benefit demonstra-
tions are not adversary adjudications because they are not required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing).
63 St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co. v. F.E.R.C., 890 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
64 See id. at 447.
65 Id. at 449-50.
66 See id. at 448.
67 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
68 402 U.S. 389 (1970).
69 Id. at 409.
70 The "defined under" standard is satisfied when the proceeding is of the type de-
fined under section 554.
71 The "governed by" standard is satisfied when section 554 directly applies to the
proceedings.
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sion when it reenacted the EAJA in 1985; yet Congress included
social security hearings in its amendment of the EAJA.72 The infer-
ence to be drawn is that Congress did not consider the uncertainty of
the direct applicability of APA to social security hearings relevant to
whether the EAJA applied to such hearings. Congress was satisfied
that the EAJA applied to such hearings by virtue of the fact that these
hearings were of the type defined under section 554.73 Arguably, by
the same reasoning, the EAJA should apply to deportation proceed-
ings since a deportation hearing is also of the type defined under
section 554.
Courts have also turned to the regulations, 74 developed by the
Attorney General 75 to implement the EAJA, to determine whether or
not deportation proceedings are within the scope of the EAJA. The
regulations list the proceedings covered by the EAJA. Deportation
proceedings have not been added to the most recent promulgation
of this list.76 The exclusion of deportation proceedings is not an
oversight since the comments published with the interim rule reveal
that deportation proceedings were intentionally excluded pursuant
to Marcello.77 It follows that Congress must have been aware of this
administrative interpretation when it amended the EAJA in 1985.
The presumption is that Congress was influenced by the Attorney
General's interpretation and therefore, deportation proceedings are
not covered by the EAJA. 78
72 See H. R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEws 138.
73 See Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 291 (9th Cir. 1987), af'd on rehearing, 838
F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988).
74 28 C.F.R. § 24.103 (1990). Note that the regulation applies only to those proceed-
ings that are included in the regulatory list.
Section 554 (a) of the INA specifically excludes six kinds of actions from its provisions,
but deportation proceedings are not among them. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). Thus, it is
the regulatory scheme and not the statutory scheme that puts deportation proceedings
outside the scope of the EAJA.
75 Section 1103(a) of the INA authorizes the Attorney General to develop regulations
for the INS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
76 28 C.F.R. § 24.103 (1990).
77 See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,921, 48,922 (1981). Specifically, the supplementary informa-
tion states:
Hearings conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226 (exclusion) and 8 U.S.C. 1252 (deportation) are
exempt from the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act, Mar-
cello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 757 (1955). Therefore, the Act does not apply.
Id. This interpretation of Marcello by the Attorney General is erroneous. Marcello did not
exempt deportation hearings from the requirements of the APA. Marcello merely held that
when the hearing provisions of the INA and of the APA are in disharmony, the more
specialized provisions of the INA will take precedence over the APA provisions. See infra
notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
78 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979) ("tlt is not only
appropriate but realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these un-
usually important precedents ... and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in
conformity with them"); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("Congress is pre-
1991]
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The EAJA waives the sovereign's immunity because it allows at-
torney's fees to be recovered from the United States. The United
States Supreme Court has held that "[i]n analyzing whether Con-
gress has waived the immunity of the United States, we must con-
strue waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign."' 79 In determining the
applicability of the EAJA to deportation proceedings, some courts
have given a strict construction to the phrase "an adjudication under
section 554" concluding that the EAJA does not apply to deportation
proceedings.8 0 This view, however, runs contrary to that expressed
in the House Report for the 1985 reauthorization of the EAJA,
wherein Congress chastised the judiciary for its restrictive interpreta-
tion of the EAJA and instructed the courts to take the "expansive
view" and apply the "broader meaning." 8' In contrast to the rule
that waivers must be strictly construed, the Court in Franchise Tax
Boards of California v. USPS 8 2 ruled that "waivers by Congress of gov-
ernmental immunity in case of... federal instrumentalities must be
liberally construed." 8 3 The Court in Franchise Tax found its rule to be
in harmony with the increasing tendency of Congress to waive the
immunity of federal agencies.8 4 In two recent cases decided by the
District Court for the District of Columbia, McKenzie v. Kennickell and
Brown v. Marsh, the court allowed an interim award of attorney fees
based on a liberal construction of the Civil Rights Act.8 5
In Marcello, the Supreme Court held that deportation proceed-
ings are governed by section 242 of the INA and not by the hearing
requirements of the APA.8 6 The importance of Marcello to the cur-
rent debate is placed in proper perspective by reviewing the history
sumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt
that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change.").
79 Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983).
80 See Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1366 (6th Cir. 1988). Accord St. Louis Fuel and
Supply Co. v. F.E.R.C., 890 F.2d 446. 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Haitian Refugee Center v.
Meese, 791 F.2d 1489, 1494 (1 lth Cir.), vacated inpart on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th
Cir. 1986). But cf. Jones v. Lujan, 883 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (government cannot
assert doctrine of sovereign immunity to avoid award of attorney fees to prevailing attor-
ney who proceeded pro se under the EAJA).
81 See H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 137.
82 467 U.S. 512 (1983).
83 Id. at 517 (quoting FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940)) (emphasis added). In
fact, the Court admonished the federal agency not to accomplish the waiver of sovereign
immunity by a ritualistic formula, but instead to ascertain the scope of a waiver by refer-
ence to underlying congressional policy. Id. at 521 (citing Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 301, 389 (1939)).
84 Id. at 517 (quoting FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940)).
85 See McKenzie v. Kennickell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1987) (awarding interim at-
torney fees against federal government is not barred by doctrine of sovereign immunity);
Brown v. Marsh, 707 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1989) (awarding interim attorney fees against
Army for discrimination in its promotion practices did not violate sovereign immunity of
federal government).
86 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 308 (1955).
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of the immigration laws. Prior to the amendment of the immigration
laws in 1951, the Supreme Court, in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath8 7
held that the APA did apply to deportation hearings. 88 The Wong
Yang Sung decision triggered an immediate congressional response
and the House of Representatives passed a rider to an appropria-
tions bill which specifically exempted the INA from the adjudicatory
provisions of the APA. 89 This rider was repealed in the subsequently
enacted Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 leaving the APA
applicable to immigration cases unless "other provisions of the 1952
Immigration Act made the [APA] inapplicable." 90 The INA of 1952
contained special statutory hearing provisions for matters of depor-
tation patterned upon analogous provisions of the APA. The 1952
Immigration Act, although delineating this new methodology for de-
termining deportability, 9 1 did not contain, as was required by section
559 of the APA, 92 a specific exception from that Act. What the 1952
Immigration Act did provide was that "[tihe procedure [in the INA]
shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining de-
portability of an alien under this section."'93 The issue that arose was
whether the hearing provisions of the INA, when read in conjunction
with the "sole and exclusive procedure" language, were sufficient to
excuse deportation proceedings from the requirements of the APA's
corresponding provisions. The Marcello Court addressed this issue
and held that the hearing provisions, when coupled with language of
exclusivity, were sufficient to create such an exemption. 94
The Marcello decision has not been legislatively or judicially
overruled. On the judicial front, the Marcello rule is now applied to
exempt not only the hearing procedures of the IJ, but also that of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) from subjection to the APA. 95
87 339 U.S. 33, modified on other grounds, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
88 339 U.S. at 50. The Court stated that "the limitation to hearings 'required by
statute' [in the APA] exempts from that section's application only those hearings which
administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule, custom or special dispensation; not
those held by compulsion." Id. Consequently, the Wong Yang Sung Court held that the
APA applied to deportation hearings even though such hearings were constitutionally, as
opposed to statutorily, mandated. Id.
89 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1946).
90 Marcello, 349 U.S. at 316 (Black, J., dissenting).
91 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
92 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1988). This section provides that a "[slubsequent statute may not
be held to supersede or modify this subchapter .. .except to the extent that it does so
expressly." Id.
93 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).
94 Marcello, 349 U.S. at 308-10.
95 See Ho Chong Tsao v. INS, 538 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977) (holding that the APA has no relevance to the Board's review
of an 1J's refusal to revoke the alien's deportation order). See aLso Cisternas-Estay v. INS,
531 F.2d 155, 158-59 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); Giambanco v. INS, 531
F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that the APA applies not only to deportation pro-
ceedings held before the IJ but also to hearings held before the Board of Immigration
Appeals).
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On the legislative front, Congress had the opportunity, when it reen-
acted the EAJA in 1985, to overrule the decision of the Attorney
General not to include deportation proceedings in the list of pro-
ceedings covered by the EAJA. 96 Congress' silence at this crucial
juncture has given succor to the Marcello decision. Although stand-
ing on sound judicial and legislative footing, the Marcello decision is
susceptible to two attacks. First, the intent of Congress while enact-
ing the 1952 Immigration Act was to reinstate the Wong Yang Sung
decision and to make it the law of the land.9 7 Although this clearly
expressed intent was recognized by the dissent, it escaped the major-
ity in Marcello.98 This oversight remains a blemish on Marcello's legal
standing. Second, the original proposal that evolved into the 1952
Immigration Act contained the provision that "[n]otwithstanding any
other law, including . . [the Administrative Procedure Act], the pro-
ceedings so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining the deportability of an alien who is in the United
States." 99 The phrase, "[n]otwithstanding any other law, including
the ... [Administrative Procedure Act]" was omitted from the final
bill. Thus, the bill that finally passed did not expressly supersede the
requirements of the APA.t 00
Despite these susceptibilities, the Marcello decision continues to
flourish unabated. While contending with the applicablilty of Mar-
cello to immigration proceedings, it must be borne in mind that "Mar-
cello did not hold that deportation proceedings are excluded or
exempted from section 554 [of the APA]."'' Indeed, immigration
proceedings are governed by the APA. 10 2 Marcello held only that
96 See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
97 98 CONG. REC. 4416 (1952). Congress made very clear its intention to reinstate
Wong Yang Sung:
Instead of destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we undo what the
Congress did in a deficiency appropriation bill several years ago when it leg-
islated to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court, which ruled that the
Administrative Procedures Act is applicable in deportation proceedings. So,
here, instead of our destroying the Administrative Procedures Act, we actu-
ally see that it is reinstated in every instance.
Id. at 4302.
98 See Note, Inapplicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to Adjudications Before the
Board of Immigration Appeals, 8 SETON HALL L. REv., 250, 272 n. 119 (1977). The writer
states:
The most disturbing aspect of the [Marcello] opinion.., was the short shrift
given to the.., holding in Wong Yang Sung .... Immediately upon repeal of
the Appropriations Rider, one of the APA's sponsors had indicated that the
decision should have been reinstated to its full force and effect .... Yet, the
majority in Marcello chose to ignore its constitutional, as opposed to purely
statutory, imperative. (Citations omitted).
Id.
99 See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 317 (Black, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
100 See id.
101 Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1988).
102 See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (an alien whose deportation has
been ordered under the INA of 1952 may have his order reviewed under the APA); Wong
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when the requirements of the INA and of the APA diverge, the more
specialized hearing provisions of the INA govern. Amendments to
immigration regulations have virtually eliminated the differences be-
tween the hearing provision of the APA and the INA.10 3 The elimi-
nation of these differences has de facto placed deportation
proceedings within the sphere of the APA.
The Ardestani decision which emanated from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that the EAJA did not apply to deportation proceedings. 104
Two prior cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit, Jean v. Nelson and
Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, allowed attorney's fees to be recovered
under the EAJA in immigration proceedings. '0 5 Yet, both Nelson and
Haitian Refugee Center are distinguishable because they did not "in-
volve the specific facts of a deportation proceeding."' 10 6 The EAJA
contains two similar provisions for the recovery of attorney's fees
and costs. 10 7 Section 504(a)(1) of the EAJA requires an agency that
conducts an adversary adjudication to award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party.' 08 Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA, on the other
hand, requires a court to award fees to the prevailing party in any
civil action including proceedings for judicial review of agency ac-
tion. 10 9 Nelson and Haitian Refugee Center did not involve agency ac-
tions nor did they involve judicial review of agency actions. Instead,
they were class action suits brought by private parties against INS
challenging the agency's programs and policies."10 Therefore, pur-
suant to section 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA, attorney's fees were
awarded to the class action plaintiffs in Nelson and in Haitian Refugee
Center because the plaintiffs were the prevailing parties in their civil
suits against the INS."' Since these actions were not proceedings
under the INA, the "adversary adjudication" determination was
irrelevant.
The legislative history of the EAJA states that its fee-shifting
provision"12 "is not intended to replace or supersede any existing
Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (discretionary denials of suspension
of deportation are reviewable under the APA).
103 See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 309-10.
104 Ardestani v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 904 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1990).
105 See Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (11 th Cir. 1988) (Haitian refugees brought action
challenging policies of the INS of holding mass exclusion hearings and of detaining Hai-
tian refugees during pendency of applications for asylum without any parole); Haitian Ref-
ugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986) (Haitian class successfully
challenged legality of INS program to accelerate processing of applications made by Hai-
tians for asylum).
106 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1514.
107 See supra note 1.
108 See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988).
109 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988).
110 See supra note 105.
III See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
112 Id.
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fee-shifting statute."" 3 Section 292 of the INA allows an alien to be
represented at a deportation proceeding by counsel of his choosing
provided the representation comes at "no expense to the govern-
ment.,"114 Courts are polarized in their analysis of whether the provi-
sion of section 292 is a fee-shifting provision." 5 A similar issue was
faced by the Ninth Circuit in Wolverton v. Heckler."16 The court, in
Wolverton, held that section 206(b) of the Social Security Act" 7 did
not provide for attorney fee-shifting since it specified only a limita-
tion on the amount that a successful claimant of disability benefits
must pay toward lawyer's fees. 1 8 In a similar vein, section 292 of
the INA does not provide for fee-shifting; it merely limits the availa-
bility of government paid counsel for indigent aliens.' 19
The parenthetical phrase in section 292 of the INA expresses
"Congress's intent to grant aliens the right to be represented by
counsel [in deportation proceedings], but not to grant indigent
aliens the right to have counsel appointed at government ex-
pense." 20 Such an intent is apparent in the decision of courts con-
struing section 292.121 Courts have so far "refUsed to go beyond the
statutory right of access to counsel, and they have held that indigent
aliens are not constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel."' 122
However, in Aguilera-Enriquez v. I.N.S. 12 3 and in Magallanes-Damian v.
I.N.S.,124 the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have obliquely suggested that
such an entitlement exists based on the constitutional guarantee of
due. process. 125 A future court may find the parenthetical language of
113 H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 4997.
"14 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
"15 Compare Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'don rehearing,
838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988)(Legislative history makes it clear that "except as otherwise
specifically provided" clause was intended to refer only to other fee-shifting statutes and
section 292 of the INA is clearly not such a statute) with Ardestani v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 904 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11 th Cir. 1990) (treating section 292 of the INA that bars the
privilege of availability of appointed counsel as a fee-shifting provision).
116 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
117 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1982).
118 See Wolverton, 726 F.2d at 582.
119 See Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 1988).
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Perez-Perez v. Hanberry, 781 F.2d 1477, 1482 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (holding
that excludable aliens are not entitled to representation at government expense in habeas
corpus proceedings challenging denial of parole).
122 Note, Right to Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (1988)
(citing Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976); Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1113 (1975); Henriques v. INS, 465 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
968 (1973)).
123 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
124 783 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1986).
125 See Aguikra-Ennquez, 516 F.2d at 569 ("[D]ue process must be afforded in deporta-
tion proceedings [and] any right a petitioner may have to counsel is grounded in the fifth
amendment guarantee of due process."); Magallanes-Damian, 783 F.2d at 933 ("Where an
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section 292 to be unconstitutional.
IV. Significance of the Ardestani Decision
The Ardestani court's decision is inconsistent with the congres-
sional policy underlying the EAJA.1 26 By giving the statutory phrase
"adjudication under section 554-127 a "governed by"' 28 interpreta-
tion, the court has narrowed the scope of the EAJA.' 29 The narrow-
ing of the EAJA's scope serves the government's own interest by
limiting its liability. However, it hinders the deportees by making
their access to counsel more difficult in deportation proceedings.' 30
Instead of quibbling over the technicality of the meaning of "an ad-
judication under section 554,"I31 the court should have heeded the
dissent's advice to put its focus on the phrase "adjudication required
by statute to be determined on the record."' 3 2 Broadening the
scope of the EAJA is justified because there have been far fewer
claims for recovery of attorney's fees under the EAJA than antici-
pated when the Act was first promulgated.' 33
The Ardestani court's restrictive interpretation of the EAJA, pre-
cluding its application to deportation proceedings, has stultified the
spirit of the EAJA. 's4 The two major purposes of the EAJA are 1) to
deter unjustified governmental actions by expanding the govern-
ment's liability for such actions and 2) to aid victims of unjustified
government action. 13s The court's overly restrictive interpretation
of what constitutes an adversary adjudication has stifled the first pur-
pose of the EAJA because it allows the government impunity from
liability for unjustified actions. The facts of Ardestani clearly illustrate
this point. INS escaped liability in spite of the fact that it denied
unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present his position adequately to
an immigration judge, he must be provided with a lawyer at the Government's expense.
Otherwise, fundamental fairness would be violated").
126 See H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 132, 136 (primary purpose of the EAJA is to increase individual's
accessibility to justice).
127 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(l)(C)(i) (1988).
128 See supra note 71.
129 See Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 287 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd on rehearing, 838
F.2d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 1988). Under this restrictive "governed under" interpretation,
deportation proceedings would be excluded from the ambit of the EAJA.
Is0 An alien's poor grasp and knowledge of English makes this lack of access to coun-
sel of greater concern than would be the case with a similarly situated individual who was
conversant with the language.
131 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(l)(C)(i) (1988).
132 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
.133 See H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985), reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 132, 137.
1S4 See Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1089,
1094 (1984) (unduly narrow interpretation of the EAJA frustrates Congress' purpose of
encouraging individuals to challenge unjustified governmental action).
135 See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4984.
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appellant's application for political asylum in egregious contempt of
the State Department's determination that a well-founded fear of
persecution had been established by the appellant.' 3 6 The second
major purpose of the EAJA is also equally frustrated because attor-
neys now have no incentive to represent an alien in a deportation
proceeding since such proceedings have been ruled to be beyond the
scope of the EAJA.
The Ardestani court's decision not only removes deportation pro-
ceedings from the ambit of the EAJA, but also leaves unclear the
requirements that other administrative agencies must meet to come
within the scope of the EAJA. In the past, courts had clearly speci-
fied two requirements to be met for proceedings to qualify under the
EAJA.'3 7 By ignoring these requirements, the Ardestani court has
now made it very difficult to predict which proceedings will qualify
under the EAJA.' 3 8
The Ardestani court relied heavily on the Marcello decision to ar-
rive at its conclusions.' 3 9 It did so on the sole basis that Marcello had
not been legislatively or judicially overruled and failed to examine
the suspect foundations of Marcello.140 Even given the reality that
the Ardestani court was bound by the Supreme Court's Marcello deci-
sion, the Ardestani court should have recognized that Marcello held
only that when the requirements of the INA and of the APA diverge,
the more specialized requirements of the INA govern.' 4 ' Amend-
ments to the immigration regulations have made the hearing provi-
sions of the INA and the APA virtually identical making the
application of Marcello to the instant case inapposite. 42 The court's
decision also was tainted with an illogical derivation. Assuming ar-
guendo that Marcello applied to the instant case, the derivation is that
the APA hearing provisions would not apply to deportation proceed-
ings. This does not preclude the determination that deportation
proceedings are of the type defined under the APA. 143 Thus, the
court's application of Marcello to the instant case was not well-
founded.
136 INS relies on the expertise of the State Department to make the determination of a
well-founded fear of persecution. By ignoring the State Department's expert recommen-
dation, the INS made the basis of its action to deny asylum unreasonable.
137 See, e.g., Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 293 (9th Cir. 1987), af'don rehearing,
838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988) (The first requirement is that the government must be rep-
resented by counsel and the second requirement is that the proceeding must be one re-
quired by statute to be decided on the record).
138 The Ardestani court's refusal to recognize the criteria used by the courts in the past
to make a determination of an adversary adjudication injects unpredictability in future
determinations of this kind.
139 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1511.
140 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 101-03.
142 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1516 (Pittman, J., dissenting).
143 Id.
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The Ardestani court's opinion also relied to a large extent on the
Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Owens ' 44 that a waiver of immunity must
be strictly construed in favor of the United States.' 45 Ironically, the
Owens court did not depend on this reasoning to arrive at its own
decision and took pains to distinguish its case from Escobar Ruiz. 146
In fact, the Owens court placed greater reliance on the fact that the
type of proceeding involved in its case was specifically exempted
from section 554, unlike a deportation proceeding which is not ex-
empted.147 The concurring opinion of Judge Nelson disavowed the
majority's criticism of Escobar Ruiz 148 by stating that "[olur criticism
of Escobar Ruiz, which may or may not be well taken, is clearly not
central to our holding in the case at bar."' 49 Shorn of its depen-
dence on Owens, the Ardestani decision stands on very suspect footing.
Ardestani's foundations are further weakened by the current tendency
of Congress to waive the immunity of federal agencies and a corre-
sponding tendency on the part of federal courts to construe existing
waivers of immunity of federal instrumentalities in a liberal
manner. 150
Nelson and Haitian Refugee Center, decided by the Eleventh Circuit
prior to Ardestani, allowed attorney's fees to be recovered in immigra-
tion proceedings. The Ardestani court was quick to distinguish these
cases on the basis that they were suits brought against INS challeng-
ing the agency's program and did not involve deportation proceed-
ings against an individual alien. 15 1 Although this distinction does
have merit, the diametrically opposed holdings will have a deleteri-
ous impact on deportees. The Ardestani decision will effectively
shield the INS from liability for its unjustified actions in deportation
proceedings against individual aliens. It is only when INS's actions
occur with such frequency that the actions rise to the level of a pro-
gram or a policy that the courts will allow the recovery of attorney's
fees. The absence of protection against unjustified government ac-
tion for the individual alien can scarcely be defended as good public
policy.
The Ardestani court chose to treat section 292 of the INA as a
fee-shifting provision despite the fact that provisions of a similar na-
ture had not been treated as fee-shifting provisions by other
courts. 15 2 The court erred in its interpretation of the phrase "at no
144 d. at 1510.
145 See Owens, 860 F.2d at 1366.
146 Id. at 1366-67.
147 Id.
148 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
149 Owens, 860 F.2d at 1370 (Nelson, J., concurring).
150 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
151 Ardestani, 904 F.2d at 1514.
152 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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expense to the Government"; 153 plainly, the phrase was "designed
to deal with the relationship between indigency and the right to
counsel"' 54 and not to deal with the question of fee-shifting. The
court's interpretation of section 292 decreases the indigent alien's
access to counsel by removing deportation proceedings from the am-
bit of the EAJA. Thus, the result achieved by the court's interpreta-
tion of section 292 of the INA is to defeat the purpose of the
EAJA. 1 5
V. Conclusion
The Ardestani court's holding that deportees are not entitled to
recover attorney's fees under the EAJA when the deportee prevails
against the government defeats the EAJA's legislative purpose of en-
couraging individuals to challenge unjustified government action. 156
The court's decision also adds confusion to the process of determin-
ing what types of proceedings are covered by the EAJA.157 The
court's reliance on Marcello was not well-founded in view of the elimi-
nation of the differences between the APA and the INA hearing pro-
visions. 158 In addition, the court's reliance on Owens was misplaced
because Owens involved a FECA and not a deportation proceed-
ing. 159 Moreover, by allowing attorney's fees to be recovered in
class action immigration suits but refusing to do so in deportation
proceedings, the court ignored the plight of single aliens.160 Finally,
by its misconceived interpretation of section 292 of the INA, the
court has denied indigent aliens accessibility to counsel. 16
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153 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
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